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Case No .. 7600 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH JUDKINS, DAN J. MILLER, 
FRANK OBORN, and ARDIAN DE BLOOIS, 
BOYD N. FRONK, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
Defendant and Appellant 
Respondents do not controvert Appellant's State-
ment of Facts as being inconsistent, but contend his state-
ment is incomplete in many vital particulars and there-
for submit their own Statement of Facts as follows: 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 16th day of January, 1942, the War Pro-
duction Board was established by executive order by 
the President of the United States and given authority to 
allocate, ration and control the use of building. and other 
materials, which were necessary in the carrying on of 
war. (Fdgs. Par. 6) That said board was functioning and 
its controls in effect at the time the defendant received a 
building permit on June 7, 1945, to construct a store and 
gas station on the property in question. That defendant is 
a carpenter by trade and has been for many years and 
knew, on June 7,1945, when he applied for a building per-
mit, that there were shortages and a priority on building 
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materials and that there had been during the years 1943, 
1944 and 1945. ( Fdgs. Par. 12 Tr. 65) 
That the permit No. 3228 D issued was for erection 
of a store and service station building 20 by 40 feet, valu-
ation of proposed work $3,000.00, fee paid $6.00 (Fdgs. 
Par. 10, Exh. G) 
That the permit issued had written on the face there-
of a provision providing in part as follows : 
''And the said party is further notified and warned 
under penalties provided by the Revised Ordinance 
of Ogden City, that they must conform to all of said 
ordinances, and all rules and decisions of the Build-
ing Inspector, and all work to be done in accordance 
with the statement set forth herein and that no 
changes in or departure from the general dimensions 
or construction described above, and further shown 
by the plans and specifications filed, will be allowed 
without permission and approved by the Building 
Inspector. This permit is void if work is not com-
menced within 60 days or if work is suspended for 
60 days." 
Also in effect at the time of the issuance of the permit 
in 1945 was an ordinance which adopted a Building Code 
which contained the following provisions: 
''Every permit issued by the Building Officials un-
der the provisions of the Code shall expire by limita-
tion and become null and void, if the building or 
work authorized by such permit is not commenced 
within 60 days from the date of sueh permit~ or if 
the building or work authorized by such permit is 
-2-
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suspended or abandoned at any time after the work 
is commenced for a period of 60 days. Before such 
'vork can be recommenced_a new permit shall be first 
obtained so to do, and the fee therefor shall be one-
half the amount required for a nev¥ permit for such 
'vork, provided no changes have been made or will 
be made in the original plans and specifications for 
such 'vork; and provided, further, that such sus-
pension or abandonment has not exceeded one year.'' 
(Fdgs. Par. 3, Exh. H) 
That the Appellant began work on the premises in 
June, 1945, and this work continued until March, 1946. 
That at no time have there been any foundation concrete 
poured for the building nor any construction of the sta-
tion or store building nor use of said premises for the 
business of a store or service station. No construction 
work was done on said premises from March, 1946, until 
October, 1948, (Tr. 61, 62, 63, 64) and work on said prem-
ises and building was suspended continuously through-
out this period. (Fdgs. Par. 4) The Appellant bought 
pipe in the summer of 1946, (Tr. 47, 48) but thereafter 
he did not make inquiry for materials nor exert any ef-
fort to go forward with the construction nor do anything 
looking to construction until he purchased two wash 
basins and two toilets for the station in the fall of 1947. 
(Fdgs. Par. 4, Tr. 62) 
Appellant then did nothing on or off the pr~mises 
furthering the project until his appearance before the 
City Commission in October 13, 1948. That the Appel-
lant failed to comply with the conditions prescribed by 
the permit and building code designating time require-
-3-
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ments for construction. (Fdgs. Par. 4) 
That prior to and subsequent to the lifting of priori-
ties and controls over building materials on July 25, 
1947, a great many people did find materials and did 
construction work. (Tr. 73, Fdgs. Par. 13, Exh. I) That 
subsequent to the lifting of controls on July 25, 1947, ma-
terials were on a "first come, first served" basis. (Tr. 
70) 
That while demand for materials exceeded the sup-
ply, pipe was one of the most critical-one of the most 
desperate things-(Tr. 32, 36) and tanks and steel plate 
were critically short. (Tr. 38) Appellant obtained both 
of these items, pipe (Tr. 47, 48), tanks (Tr. 43). 
That on October 13, 1948, Appellant filed an appli-
cation with the City Engineer for erection of a service 
station on premises in Ogden, building 28 by 40 feet, valu-
ation of proposed work $8,000.000. (Fdgs. Par. 10, Ex. B) 
fee specified of $18.00, was that for issuance of new per-
mit. This application was denied by City Engineer. 
(Fdgs. Par. 8) Appellant then appeared before Ogden 
City Commission and requested that a building permit 
which he purchased three years ago be renewed. Engineer 
Kimball asked that the records show whether the permit 
is renewed or issued in exception to the ordinance. There-
upon Mayor Peery moved as follows: 
''Permit be issued to Boyd N. Fronk in exception to 
the ordinance providing the property owners in the 
neighborhood do not object within one \Veek. '' 
which motion was seconded ~nd on vote carried. ( Fdgs. 
Par. 8, Ex. C) That said motion did not require notice 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to property owners in the neighborhood and no notice 
was in fact given them. (Fdgs. Par. 8) On October 28, 
1948, the City Con1mission approved application of Ap-
pellant, (Ex. B) and permit No. 205-E issued. 
That in August, 1946, ordinance No. 246 was enacted 
by Ogden City making the operation of a store or serv-
ice station on the Appellant's property in question a non-
conforming use which o'rdinance is now still in force and 
effect. (Tr. 3) This ordinance as enacted had no provision 
saving the rights of holders of then outstanding per-
mits. 
That Appellant plans on erecting a service station 
.. building pursuant to permit No. 3228-D or permit 250-E 
and respondents seek an injuction restraining construc-
tion and operation of service station building. 
ARGUMENT 
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 1 
The permit of June 7, 1945, was issued under the 
following circumstances : 
1. The War Production Board since 1942 had been 
exercising control over building materials denying allo-
cations of them for commercial construction. 
2. The Appellant was a carpenter and knew there 
were shortages of materials and a priority was neces-
sary in ~he years 1943, 1944, and 1945. 
3. That the Jlermit issued provided on its face that 
it was to be void if "'~ork is suspended for 60 days. That 
the Appellant undertook the hazards attendant on this 
constru·ction with the knowledge that if he were not able 
-5-
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to comply with the time requirements of the permit and 
work was suspended that the permit would be void, and 
rights under the permit lost. 
Appellant cites 40 AL~ 928. 
The first paragraph of that annotation reads: 
'This annotation does not include ... nor does it in-
clude the right to revoke a permit where the owner 
does not proceed in accordance with the plans for 
the permit.'' 
That Appelant failed to meet the conditions of the per-
mit by suspending work for more than 60 days and more 
than 1 year, and thus lost his rights under the permit. 
In none of the cases cited by Appellant under Point 
No. 1 does it appear that the permits issue~ contained 
time and work suspensi_on conditions nor reveal a build-
ing code in effect providing that permits expire by limi-
tation and become void if work is suspended for 60 
days. 
Appellant cites Trans-oceanic Oil Corporation v. 
City of Santa Barbara, 194 P (2) 148. A permit was 
granted to drill for oil. "It fixed p.o time as to when 
work was to be commenced or as to when the work was 
to be finished, its concluding sentence reading: 
"Th. 1· t . t " 1s 1cense erm1na es -------------------------------· ___ ·----· 
The blank was never filled in. P 150. 
In a written Memorandum of Opinion the trial judge 
stated (P 152) 
''That since the permit was silent upon the question 
of how soon appellant was required to commence 
drilling operations, it had a reasonable time in which 
-6-
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to proceed . . . ' ' 
At page 156, the court said the license or permit ... is 
itself the permission and contains the conditions with 
which the permittee must comply in order to lawfully 
drill, and at Pag·e 152 said: 
'• If the permittee does nothing beyond obtaining the 
permit or fails to co1nply with reasonable terms or 
conditions granted the proper authorities may re-
vode it." 
The last case cited by Appellant under Point No. 1, 
Atlas v. Dick, 81 NYS (2) 126 (1948) appears to have 
been reversed on appeal to the Appellant division. See 
86 NYS (2) 231. 
The following are cases in which the permittee failed 
to heed O_! comply with conditions of the permit and or-
dinances. 
Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City and 
County of San Francisco, 144 P (2) 4. California, (1943). 
Rehearing denied January 13, , 1944. The defendant 
passed an emergency ordinance authorizing the waiver 
of health, safety and fire regulations pertaining to home 
construction during the war emergency. The plaintiff, 
under the ordinance, secured permission from the Fed-
eral Housing Authority to erect homes in a residential 
area, acquired the property and obtained a permit and 
prepared to erect 31 single family dwellings. On July 29, 
1943, 27 permits and 4 others were granted to the plain-
tiff by the Central Permit Bureau and petitioner prompt-
ly started construction work, purchasing and moving 
materials on to the property, hiring and assembling 
-7-
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workmen and laying foundations for the buildings as 
specified. On August 4, 1943, a home owner near said 
tract took an appeal from the action of Central Permit 
Bureau in issuing permits, to the Board of Permit Ap-
peals. The Board affirmed the action of the Permit Bur-
eau and petitioner continued its construction work. Pro-
testants filed petition for rehearing on September 4, 
which was heard on September 22, 1943, and on Septem-
ber 22, the board reversed its prior ruling and ordered 
the cancellation of all 31 permits. The plaintiff there-
upon took an appeal directly to the court for a writ of 
mandamus commanding the reinstatement of the 31 per-
mits and pointed out the expenditures made by him pur-
suant to the permits granted hiln. 
The court, after discussing the propriety of the pro-
cedure by writ of mandate and the authority given the 
Board of Permit Appeals pointed out the following lang-
uage in the permit: 
''This permit issued subject to appeal within 10 days 
to Board of Permit Appeals. Incur no expense under 
this permit until right of appeal had lapsed." 
It also pointed out a provision of the ordinance provid-
ing ''permitting discussion by the Board of Permit Ap-
peals.'' Despite the plaintiff's appeal that an emergency 
for housing existed, that prompt construction work was 
ncessary and funds ex12.ended, the court upheld the ac-
tion of the Board of Permit Appeals in cancelling all of 
the permits previously issued, discharged the alternative 
'vrit and a peremptory writ was denied. 
Also to Selljgman, et al., v. Western and Southern 
Life Insurance company, ·Kentucky, 1938 126 SW (2) 
-8-
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419. In this case the building inspector issued a permit 
for a garage building on February 7, 1948, and work was 
begun immediately. On ~farch 21, 1938, the building in-
spector issued a stop order, for failure to observe condi-
tions in the permit, Re: Re-locate entrances, side line re-
quire!flents and architecture conformity. The builder ap-
pealed to the Board of Adjustn1ent and Appeals from 
the stop order. The Board upheld the stop order, denied 
the appeal from which order the builder prosecuted an 
appeal to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court adjudged 
that the building permit issued February, 1938, was in 
full force and effect and the builder was authorized to 
co~plete the building of the garage pursuant to the per-
mit. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed the Cir-
cuit Court and justified the building inspector in stop-
ping the work. The builder insisted that the building in-
spector could not lawfully revoke the permit because 
large sums of money were spent in reliance on it: Authori-
ties are cited on Page 425 of the decision. The Court 
took the view that the builder did not acquire vested 
rights which could not be lost. 
Al~o to State v. Turgeon, Ohio, (1947) 77 NE (2) 
283. Defendant purchased real estate and on the same 
day secured a business permit. An ordinance read in 
part, ''After permit has been issued same may be re-
voked if work for such permit is not commenced in six 
(6) months from issue." Failing to commence work the 
city revoked permit. A new ordinance was enacted mak-
ing business use non-conforming. Defendant filed appli-
cation for second permit, was refused. Mandamus order-
jng issuance of permit reversed. 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Also Vincent Petroleum Corporation v. Culver City, 
111 P (2) 433, California (1941). Plaintiff spent $68,-
000.00 under a permit to drill for oil. ])efendant granted 
several extensions of the permit, the last one up to May 
30, 1937, on the condition the well be placed on commer-
cial production before that date. Plaintiff failed to do 
this, permit was cancelled. 
In Godson v. Town of Surfside, 8 So. (2) 497, Flori-
day (1942) a permit issued with the condition imbedded 
thereon ''that it might be revoked at any time upon vio-
lation of any provision of ... ordinances or change in 
plans, etc .... '' Plaintiff began construction. Defendant 
cancelle.d permit as completed building would stand part-
ly within a prohibited distance of Atlantic Ocean in vio-
lation of city ordinance. 
Harper v. Jonesboro, 22 SE 139, Georgia, (1894). 
Permit issued on condition no obstruction or sidewalk, 
nor covering requiring posts. Plaintiff failed to observe 
and defendant revoked permit. 
Publicity Leasing Con1pany v. Ludwig, 158 NYS 
208 (1916). February, 1914, got permit to erect a large 
sign. May, 1914, city adopted new ordinance limiting size 
of signs. Plaintiff's signs were built at cost of $1300.00. 
Expenditures did not create vested right, permit can-
celled. 
See Stringham v. Salt Lake City, Utah, (1949) 201 
P (2) 758 where license reserved right in city to revoke, 
which it did despite heavy investment in signs by li-
censees. 
IN ANSWER ~rO APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 2 
Re: Vested right not lost when national emergency pre-
vented obtaining materials. 
-10-
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The war emergency legislation which Appellant 
clain1ed prevented hiln obtaining materials was enacted 
in 19±2 and in effect more than 3 years before Appellant 
made application for permit. 
He was a carpenter and knew there were shortages 
in materials and a priority necessary when he applied 
for the permit, and before any money was expended re-
ceived a permit which advised him of time requirements 
and compliance with city ordinance. 
That the Appellant acquired in 1945 steel tanks, de-
scribed by respondents' 'vitness as ''critically short,'' 
(Tr. 38) and pipe, difficult to obtain. (Tr. 32, 36) 
That after purchase of pipe in the summer of 1946, 
appellant did nothing whatsoever looking toward con-
struction until two toilets and wash basins were bought 
in the fall of 1947, and then nothing whatsoever again 
until application for a new permit October 13, 1948. Par. 
13 of Findings and Exh. I, show commercial construc-
tion that was completed before and after priorities were 
lifted. Those completed after July 25, 194 7, were finished 
when materials were on a ''first come; first served'' 
basis. ( Tr. 70) 
Authority cited by Appellant, National Yeast Cor-
poration v. City of Crystal Lake (Page 11 of Appellant's 
brief) concerned an agreement made November 10, 1939, 
for conditions of renewa] of an option in 1944. Parties 
were entitled to relief as war conditions could not have 
been anticipated in 1939. 
Under facts of present case, material, controls and 
shortages were existing when permit issued and project 
was undertaken. Neither war, emergency legislation nor 
-11-
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shortages wer~ unexpected conditions which prevented 
construction. 
In National.Lumber Products Company vs. Ponzio, 
New Jersey, (1945) 42 A (2). 753, plaintiff claimed undue 
hardship as he was engaged in fulfilling a war contract 
and sought exception to the zoni~~ requirements. At page 
756 court observes that plaintiff undertook war work 
with full knowledge of its equipment on hand and knew, 
or was charged with knowing, he could not enlarge the 
non-conforming use. Despite such factual and legal 
knowledge plaintiff apparently chose to take a chance 
and installed its equipment. 
War emergencies no justification for suspending op .. 
eration of ordinance. 
Wilkins v. San Bernardino, et al, Calif. (1946) 175 
p (2) 542. 
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT NO. :3 
City had power to renew ... 
Respondents' Point A is that Board of City Com-
mission had no authority to grant exception to ordinance 
by renewing permit or otherwise, and reference is made 
to Point A for further response to Appellant's Point No. 
3. 
Ordinance 246 made service station at Appellant's 
lot a non-conforming use; any action by City Commis-
::non by re~olution or otherwisf\ to vary ordinance would 
be illegal. 
Function of Board of Examiners and Appeals re-
-12-
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ferred to by Appellant on Page 13 of brief, was to de-
termine suitability of alternate materials and types of 
construction. (Fdgs. Par. 11) No authority to renew per-
mits, override Building Inspector's denial of permit nor 
authorize issuance of permit tor non-conforming use was 
among powers granted and if City Commission was act-
ing for Board of Examiners and Appeals as Appellant 
suggests on Page 13, it would be limited to determining 
alternate materials. 
The City Comnrission, by Ordinance 144, adopting 
a buildi~g code fixed the conditions for loss of permit 
and issuance of a new permit. (Fdgs. Par. 3) Old permit 
expired by limitation if work suspended for 60 days. Be-
fore work could be recommended a new permit had to be 
obtained issuable on payment of one-half fee providing: 
A. No changes in plans and specifications. 
B. That suspension had not exceeded one year. 
Application failed to qualify on both conditions, having 
changed the plans and specifications, (Fdgs. Par. 10) and 
having suspended work more than 1 year. (Fdgs. Par. 4. 
Cone. Par. 6) 
Giordano v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Du-
mont, New Jersey, (1948) 61 A (2) 245. The plaintiff 
failed to commence work in 1 year as permit required. 
Thereafter enactment of an ordinance making the use 
non-conforming, obtained a second permit and claimed it 
was an extension of the first permit. The lower court held 
that appellant obtained an extension of his permit, but 
the court of Errors and Appeals held at Page 246 that 
the first permit expired by its own limitation and having 
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thus expired. was not susceptible of extension or -renew-
al after its expiration. 
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 4 
Abandonment is made up of act and intent, Vol. I, 
Words and Phrases, Page 39., Peal vs. Gulf Red Cedar 
Company of California, Calif., (1936) 59 P (2) 183, and 
intent must be gathered from facts and circumstances of 
the case. 
A matter of intent should be determined by the 
Court in its conclusions. The Court found in Paragraph 
4 of Findings that Appellant failed to comply with time 
requirements of permit, that a great many people did 
find materials and did construction. Paragraph 12 of 
Findings and Appellant's testimony showed he made 
no inquiry for materials, even after lifting of priorities 
and materials were on a ''first come, first served basis." 
The Court properly concluded the Appellant abandoned 
the construction. 
Whether the Appellant abandoned the construction 
or not is not vital in this case, as the conditions of the 
permit did not require abandonment for permit to be 
void, only suspension of work (Exhibit A, Findings Par. 
3) and Building Code specified suspension or aban-
donment to void permit. 
RESPONDENTS' POINT NO. A 
CITY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE PERMIT 
"IN EXCEPTION TO ORDINANCE," OR G~ANT 
. RENEWAL OF PERMIT, AND CITY COM1IISSION 
ACTED ILLEGALLY IN ATTEMPTING TO DO SO. 
-14-
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Cities and towns received po,ver to enact ordinances 
regulating zoning by Title 15, Article 3, Utah Code An-
notated, 1943. Section 15-8-95 provides for the appoint-
ment of a Board of Adjustment, Section 15-8-101, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, provides in part as _follows: 
' ~ ( 2) To hear and decide special exceptions to the 
terms of the ordinance upon which such board is re-
quired to pass under such ordinance. (3) To author-
ize upon appeal such variance from the terms of the 
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public inter-
est, where owing to special conditions a literal en-
forcement of the provisions of the ordinance will re-
sult in unnecessary hardship; PROVIDED, that the 
spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and sub-
stantial justice done.'' 
Pursuant to these sections Ogden City enacted its ordin-
ance No. 41-17, Board of Adjustment, which ordinance 
is attached to the complaint herein and by reference 
made a part thereof. That ordinance reads in part as 
follows: 
"Said board shall adopt rules, subject to the pro-
visions of the laws of the State of Utah in such case 
made and provided, for the regulation of its pro-
cedure and conduct of its duties and shall have power 
to hear and decide special exceptions to the terms 
of this ordinance in specific cases where a variance 
from the terms of this ordinance will not be con-
trary to the public interest, where owing to special 
conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions 
of the ordinance will result in any unnecessary hard-
ship ... " (Complaint 016, and Tr. 3) 
-15-
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The Appellant here made no appeal to the Board 
of Adjustment but made his request directly to the City 
Commission. That the governing body of the city is with-
out authority to grant an exception to an ordinance· is 
held in the following cases : 
In Lynch v. The Burough of Hillsdale, et al, in the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, (1947) 54 A (2) 723, the 
governing body of the Burough of Hillsdale adopted a 
resolution purporting to grant to the defendant permis-
sion to ''change the use'' of a building to a .non-conform-
ing use in violation of an existing ordinance. The prop-
erty owner alleges that said governing body ''can do by 
resolution whatever the Board of Adjustment is author-
ized to do.'' The court rejects this contention and states 
as follows: 
''The determination of the question of variance and 
special exceptions has been confined by the legisla-
. ture to the specialized judgment of the zoning 
board.'' 
The action of the governing body in attempting to grant 
an exception to the ordinance was a wholly ineffective 
exercise of the local legislative power. 
As stated in Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 
97 Utah 249, 92 ~Pacific (2) 724. Our Supreme Court 
stated as follows: 
The municipality is a creation, a creature of the 
legislature. It has only such powers as are granted 
to it by the state and such as are necessary are reas-
onably implied to enable it to perform the duties and 
functions and exercise the privileges conferred upon 
it. 
-16-
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Authority to grant exceptions to the ordinance was ex-
tended by the Utah State Legislature and by city ordin-
ance only to the Board of Adjustment. 
Chicago Railroad v. the City of Chicago, Ill., (1898) 
51 N. E. 596. City ordinance required certain grade in 
the streets. The City Council, by resolution, sought to 
vary the requirements of the ordinance. The court hold-
ing their action void stated the ordinance cannot be 
amended, repealed or suspended by a resolution. The 
action which modifies or suspends the ordinance must 
be one of equal dignity. 
In County Commissioners of Anne .Arundell County 
v. Herbert S. Ward, Maryland Court of Appeals (April 
1946) 165 ALR 816, 46 A (2) 684. The Board of County 
Commissioners, as an administrative body, was bound 
to follow the regulations it adopted, in the exercise of its 
delegated legislative power. The fact that it might have 
re-zoned the area, upon due notice and after hearing, does 
not alter its obligation to adhere to existing regulations, 
or authorize it to make special exceptions in individual 
cases. Chayt v. Zoning Appeal Board, 177 Md 426 9 A (2) 
747, and cases cited; Sugar v. North Baltimore Methodist 
Protestant Church, 164 Md 487, 165 A 703. Compare 
County Commissioners of Prince George's County v. N. 
W. Cemetery Co., 160 Md 653, 154 A 452, and Gordon v. 
Commissioners of Montgomery Co., 164 Md 210, 164 A 
676. 
In the case of Potts v. Board of Adjustment, (1945) 
133 NJL, 230, 43 A (2) 850 the Court said: 
Equality and uniformity of operation within the 
particular zone, as respects each class and kind of 
-17-
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buildings, are basic in the statute. Insidious distinc-
tions and discriminations are inadmissible. The es-
sence of zoning is territorial division according to 
the character of the lands and structures and their 
'peculiar suitability' for particular uses, among 
others, and uniformity of use within the division.'~ 
In Beem v.' Davis, Idaho (1918) 175 P 959, the trus .. 
tees of Twin Falls, Idaho undertook to suspend the oper-
ation of the ordinance to permit the erection of a building 
and such action was held to be illegal and beyond their 
authority. 
Two cases hold City Council may not grant an ex-
ception to an ordinance even by the enactment of a new 
ordinance for that particular purpose, are: 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Boyd, 62 A 
( 2) 588 ( 1948). Ordinance No. 124 7 provided in para-
graph No. 34 that a filling station should be permitted 
only by authority of public ordinance, and thereunder 
numerous ordinances were passed permitting the erec-
tion of filling stations. This method was subsequently 
abandoned and by Ordinance No. 318 the Board of Zon-
ing Appeals was given authority to pass. upon applica-
tions for permits for filling station. That their action 
was limited by a proviso prohibiting the filling station 
within three hundred feet of a theatre. 
The Mayor and City Councilpassed Ordinance No. 
117 by which they attempted to waive the provisions of 
paragraph 34 of Ordinance No. 247 as amended by Ordin-
ance No. 318, to permit the erection of a filling station 
within three hundred feet of a 1notion picture theatre. 
-18-. 
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Under head notes 2-5 at Page 590 the Court says: 
''The broad question in this case is how far the 
Mayor and City Council may make special excep-
tions to the Zoning Ordinance. The narrow question 
is whether their action in passing Ordinance No. 
117 is a valid exception of such power as they may 
have to make exceptions. 
Zoning is an exercise of the police power which, for 
the public good, takes away some of the rights of 
individuals to use their property as they please and 
at the same time gives them rights to restrict in-
jurious uses of the property of others. This cannot 
be done by piecemeal legislation. It can only be up-
held as part of the general plan for a community 
which sets apart certain areas for residence pur-
poses and permits commercial business in other 
areas where it is established or where such use is 
obviously suitable.'' 
The Baltimore City Court's action reversing the board's 
order was affirmed. 
and 
See Cassel v. Maxor and City Council of Baltimore, 
73 A (2) 486. Page 488. · 
The Appellant's second application for a permit in 
October, 1948, was denied by the City Engineer who at 
his appearance before the City Commission was asked 
whether or not he had any personal objections to the per-
mit to which the Engineer replied asking that the records 
show whether the permit is renewed or issued in excep-
tion to the ordinance. Whereupon it was moved and sec-
onded that the permit be issued in exception to the ordin-
ance. (Fdgs Par. 8, Exh. C) The action thus taken by the 
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City Commission was illegal and beyond their author .. 
ity. 
See Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co. 97 Utah 
249, at Page 256. 
RESPONDENTS' POINT B 
THE CITY WAS ACTING WITHIN ITS POLICE 
POWERS IN iMPOSING CONDITIONS IN PERMITS 
ISSUED AND FAILURE TO MEET THOSE CONDI-
TIONS RENDERED PERMIT VOID. 
The permit issued June 7, 1945, (Exh. A) advised 
the permittee that he must conform with all ordinances 
and that the permit would be void if the work was sus-
pended for 60 days. A building code also made the per-
mit void if work was suspended for 60 days and fixed the 
conditions for recommencing the work. (Fdgs. Par. 3, 
Exh.· H) 
Cases dealing with conditions and time requirements 
and expiration of permits are as follows: 
Giordano v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Du-
mont, New Jersey, (1948) 61 A (2) 245. Plaintiff in the 
early part of 1945 acquired title to a plot of ground and 
on June 19, 1945, obtained building permit to erect a 
gasoline station thereon. The building code provided, 
inter alia, that "any permits which may be issued by the 
building inspector ... under which no work is commenced 
within one year from the time of the issuance shall ex-
pire at the end of that time." For more than one year 
after permit 'vas issued no work was done toward erec-
tion or construction of gasoline station, so under the 
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building code the building permit expired. On July 8, 
1946, the defendants amended the zoning ordinance to 
prohibit filling stations on the plaintiff's premises, and 
five months after the adoption of the new ordinance the 
plaintiff applied for and had issued to him a building 
permit to erect a gasoline station on the same premises . 
.. A_ new building inspector took office January 1, 1947, 
and caused letters to be addressed to the plaintiff stat-
ing the permit had been issued contrary to the amended 
ordinance and was revoked. The court below held that 
the appellant obtained an extension of his building per-
mit and appellant argues that the second permit was an 
extension or renewal of the first E_ermit. The proofs do 
not disclose any written application for either building 
permit, although two permits are sho,vn, No. 3253 issued 
on June 19, 1945, and No. 3686 issued on December 9, 
1946. In the latter permit there is no mention of its being 
an extension or renewal of the first permit. The appel-
lant concedes that no work had been commenced within 
one year from June 19,-1945, the date of issuance of the 
first permit; it therefore expired by its own limitation 
and, having thus expired, was not susceptible of exten-
sion or renewal after its expiration. According, we do 
not agree that the second permit was an extension or re-
newal of the first permit. 
The lower court's action in upholding the revocation 
of the permit was affirmed in this appeal. 
In Sun Oil Co .. v. Borough of Bradley Beach, Su-
preme Court of New Jersey, (1947) 55 A (2) 778. March, 
1945, the plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase 
the property in question. On June 26, 1945, a permit to 
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erect a service station was obtained. The title of the 
property was not taken by the plaintiff until March 15, 
1946. On M~rch 12, 1946, the defendant, by resolution, 
placed a 30-day time limit for the cornmencement of 
work under a building permit and by resolution on June 
2, 1946, an ordinance was adopted precluding the erection 
of service stations in the area. After the cancellation of 
the permit the plaintiff commenced excavation and grad-
ing which work was stopped and he thereafter brought 
this action to review the resolution of the board in re-
voking his permit. The court held that the city had the 
power to change the ordinance in the interest of the pub-
lice and to fix a time in which work must be commenced, 
and put aside the claim of the plaintiff that it had a 
vested right having acted on the faith of the perrnit and 
had expended large sums of money by reason thereof. 
In Vincent Petroleum v. Culver City, (1941) 111 P 
(2) 433, plaintiff obtained a permit to drill for oil and 
spent approximately $68,000.00. Its permit was renewed 
a number of times, the last time on the condition that the 
well be placed on a commercial production basis by Mav 
30, 1937. The plaintiff failed to do this and the permit 
was cancelled, which action was upheld. 
In the case State v. Turgeon, Ohio, (1947) 77 NE 
(2) 283, the owner secured a permit but did not commence 
work in 6 months as required by the permit so the Mayor 
revoked it as the ordinance authorized. The defendant 
made application for a new permit which was refused on 
the grounds that a new ordinance had been enacted mak-
ing the use sought by the permit non-conforming. Man-
damus for the issuance of the permit was denied. 
-22-
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In the case Colonial Beacon Oil Company v. Finn, 
283 N.Y.S. 384 {1935), fron1 a peremptory order of Inan-
::::0 
damus directing the issuance of a permit for the erec-
tion of petroleum tanks, the defendant's appeal. Ordered 
reversed and application dismissed. The city ordinance 
required that before any permit be issued, complete plans 
must be submitted to the Bureau of Buildings and ap-
proved by the superintendent. A further ordinance regu-
lates the construction and installation of tanks or stor-
age of petroleum products with requirements as to kinds 
and sizes of material, manner of construction, capacity, 
and location. The building superintendent issued a teln-
porary permit which was cancelled when the plans filed 
showed non-compliance with the minimum distance re-
quirements of the ordinance. The holder of the permit, 
by failing to comply with the conditions of the ordinance 
made the cancellation of the permit by the building su-
perintendent in order. 
The permit issued the Appellant June 7, 1945, ex-
pired and became void by reason of the Appellant sus-
pending work for n1ore than 60 days. The Appellant also 
lost his right to recommence work under the building 
code, (Exh. H) by suspension and abandoning work ex-
ceeding one year and by changing the original plans and 
specifications in his second application for a permit Oc-
tober 13, 1948. The Appellant evidenced his abandon-
ment of the first permit as found by the court in its Con-
clusions by making application for a permit for a differ-
ent use, that is a service station in place of a station and 
store as first set out in the first application and permit by 
prescribing a different sized building estimated cost at 
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$8,000.00 in place of $3,000.00 and by paying the full fee 
on the second permit which carries no indication that it 
was a renewal of the first permit. 
RESPONDENTS' POINT C. 
THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE 
A PERMANENT WRIT OF INJUNCTION AS PRAY-
ED AND ORDERED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The Appellant having lost all rights under the first 
permit by his failure to meet the conditions therein fixed, 
and that permit being, therefore, void, further construc-
tion would be without a permit and for a non-conforming 
use. 
The second permit having been issued without au-
thority is a nullity and Appellant could do no further 
construction under it. See 6 ALR (2) 960. Rights of per-
mittee under illegally issued building permit. 
Respondents are entitled to have the intended con-
struction halted and Ordinance No. 246 observed and a 
permanent injuction issued. The respondents will suffer 
special damage by erection of a service station, ( Fdgs. 
Par. 1) and are entitled to maintain this action seeking 
an injuction. 
See Cassel v. Mayor, 73 A (2) 486. "Court of Equity 
has jurisdiction to grant injuctive relief against the vio-
lation of zoning ordinances on the complaint of an in-. 
dividual sustaining special damage as a result of the 
violation.'' 
See 54 ALR 361. 
Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Company, 138 A 483, 
Connecticut, (1927). 
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Respectfully sub1nitted, 
GLENN W. ADAl\fS 
LEWIS J. WALLACE 
512 Eccles Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
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